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Abstract
This article contributes to the discussion on migrants and civil society by 
directing attention towards the importance of transnational processes. 
Somali organizations in Finland will be addressed against the state-failure 
and conflict in Somalia. Among the Somalis, an NGO largely remains an 
alien and donor-driven concept, whereas clan, religious affiliations and 
associational structures may be blurred in complex ways. There is a need to 
rethink the concept of ‘civil society’ and how it could be analytically used in 
understanding transnational civic participation. The data comprises interviews 
with INGOs as well as observations and discussions with Somali associations.
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During the fieldwork in Northern Somalia, in the region known as 
Somaliland, Tiilikainen was regularly asked the same questions: 
First, are you a Muslim? Second, are you married? And third, are you 
going to open an office in Somaliland and start a new project? A lone 
foreigner who was dressed up like a local woman raised curiosity. 
By these questions the local people tried to understand who she 
was, and furthermore, to set her in the normal order of things. The 
expectation is that any foreigner visiting Somaliland or Somalia is 
somehow involved with the NGO business, a booming industry in 
the country. And not only non-Somalis, but even more so the Somali 
diaspora is expected to contribute to the rebuilding of the country by 
bringing resources and funding from their new countries of residence 
to the country of origin. Those Somalis who have managed to exit and 
find their ways to affluent countries in Europe or North America and 
whose families may have made great financial sacrifices to secure 
their risky journeys, are in turn expected to pay back by helping their 
families and communities – every returnee or a visitor is expected to 
have gained something while abroad, something which he or she may 
share with relatives and the larger community at home, i.e. money, 
gifts, education, useful skills, or a project (also Tiilikainen 2011). 
In this article, we will address some of the challenges of the 
Somali diaspora organizations as they try to establish themselves 
as civil society actors, both here and there. On one hand, there are 
great expectations towards the Somali diaspora to organize, provide 
a representative platform for Somali migrants and to facilitate the 
integration of newly arrived migrants. The Somali diaspora is also 
seen as an important, even a necessary agent in the development 
and rebuilding of Somalia. On the other hand, there is lots of mistrust 
towards the Somali diaspora, its capacity, representativeness and 
aims, including increasing fears related to possible radicalization. 
This article contributes to the discussion on migrants and civil 
society, by directing attention towards the importance of transnational 
processes and dimensions in the lives of migrants. Migrants are 
often seen and defined as civil society actors in relation to the 
countries of resettlement, not to the countries of origin (e.g. Penninx 
et al. ed. 2004). However, migrants and their organizations often 
operate in several national contexts and actively utilize transnational 
connections. There is a need to look at what ‘civil society’ in multiple 
localities may entail, and what are the frictions and opportunities that 
are produced as people, ideas, resources and imaginaries move 
between these localities. Civil society is particularly difficult to define 
in Somalia, where – since the collapse of the central government in 
1991 – any social or civic organization basically is a ‘nonstate actor’ 
(Menkhaus et al. 2010: 325–326). 
Our main focus will be on the Somali community and organizations 
in Finland, but we also try to describe the larger historical, cultural 
and diasporic context where these NGOs have been founded and 
function. Moreover, we aim to present the diversity and complexity 
within one migrant group, hence not taking the Somali community in 
Finland given or fixed (see Brubacker 2009: 28–32). At least for the 
first generation of Somali migrants the meaningful life, opportunities 
and social networks are not reduced to the receiving country, but they 
are also constructed by transnational kinship affiliations and complex 
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political realities in the fragile state of Somalia. In Finland, the Somalis 
– 14,000 Somali language speakers in 2011 – are not the largest 
migrant group in the country, but for various reasons they have raised 
discussion in the public by far the most. They are, however, the largest 
group with Muslim, refugee and African backgrounds in Finland. The 
first Somali asylum seeker groups entered Finland in 1990 when the 
central government of Somalia was about to collapse and the civil war 
had started. Unemployment rate among the Somalis is high: in 2010, 
almost 54% of the Somali speaking population was unemployed 
(Statistics Finland 2012). (It must be noted, however, that the majority 
of Somali speakers, more than 9700 people in 2010, are outside 
workforce because they are children, students or mothers who stay 
at home taking care of small children.) Somalis in Finland have also 
experienced lots of discrimination: According to a survey conducted 
in 27 EU-countries, Somalis in Finland were among the 10 immigrant 
and ethnic minority groups that had experienced discrimination the 
most – 47% of them reported incidents of discrimination over a period 
of 12 months (EU-MIDIS 2009).
We argue that in addition to the short history of ‘modern’ NGOs in 
Somalia, there are other inside and outside factors that problematize 
or even impede the creation of strong Somali diaspora associations. 
These factors relate to the social and cultural organization of the 
Somali society itself, the long period of conflict and instability in 
Somalia, and most recently the global war on terror. First, we will 
give some background information about the civil society in Somalia 
and its development past twenty years; second, we will discuss the 
engagement of the Somali diaspora organizations in general in the 
development and conflict of Somalia, and how they are perceived 
by the international community; third, we will focus on the Somali 
associations in Finland and in particular discuss how clan and 
associational life are interlinked. Finally, some conclusions will be 
presented.
This article draws from various sources of data: findings 
of the EU-funded DIASPEACE project, led by Professor Liisa 
Laakso (Universities of Jyväskylä and Helsinki); interviews of the 
representatives of some international organizations that Tiilikainen 
conducted during the 9th Horn of Africa Conference in Lund in 
June 2010 for the DIASPEACE project; as well as discussions 
and observations during her six months of ethnographic fieldwork 
in Somaliland in 2005–2011. Finally, Tiilikainen’s observations 
and discussions for the past two and half years with the member 
organizations of the Finnish Somalia Network as well as Mohamed’s 
experiences and insights gained through his several roles in the 
Somali organizations in Finland past 20 years will be utilized.2
1    Civil society and conflict in Somalia
In the Somali context, the rise of non-governmental forms of 
associations – NGOs, informal professional networks, political parties 
and interest groups which organize around issues such as children, 
women or the disabled – was an outcome of the civil war (Human 
Development Report 2001: 56.) During General Siyad Barre, who 
ruled Somalia for 21 years until 1991, it was forbidden to found or run 
a political or any other organization. The first NGOs were founded 
in the early 1980s to respond to the Ogaden refugee crisis (Human 
Development Report 2001: 56). In the late 1980s there were only 
some 15 local NGOs in the whole country, but in 1995 over 320 
NGOs were registered (Little 2003: 47). This development followed 
the collapse of the state and disastrous famine of 1991–1992. After 
the state collapse, associations could be founded freely. To found an 
NGO also became financially profitable as international aid agencies 
needed local partners. Moreover, NGOs provided for services that 
public sector did not provide after the state collapse. However, many 
of the NGOs did not survive for long, because their capacity was 
low and they remained dependent on the outside funding (Human 
Development Report 2001: 56–57). Moreover, the whole NGO 
concept was alien to the Somalis.
The NGOs were mostly established along clan lines. This is hardly 
surprising, because clan and kinship have been organizing principles 
in the Somali society. Clan is an extremely complex issue, which can 
be manipulated and used with dire consequences, but which also 
creates trust, safety, cultural intimacy, and effective networks. Kinship 
relationships may be activated when needed, in particular in times of 
need and crisis. Power sharing between different clans has also been 
one of the main issues during the prolonged conflict in Somalia. For 
example, the highly unpopular Transitional Federal Government was 
formed according to so called 4.5 formula, which means that the four 
major clans together with the remaining minority clans occupied the 
key positions in the government. Clan elders have customarily been 
the core of civil society in Somalia as they have been mediators and 
authorities in the social and political spheres of the Somali society. 
Even today, the civil society in Somalia can be characterized as a mix 
of different elements and structures, comprising local NGOs and Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs), other informal social and community 
groups, professional associations (e.g. teachers, medical doctors, 
journalists), businesspeople, traditional clan elders and most Islamic 
movements in the country (Menkhaus et al. 2010: 326–328; Shane 
& Farah 2008: 5, 9).
During the 20-year-conflict in Somalia, NGOs in general, both 
local and international ones, have been strongly criticized for 
having used the war for their own benefits: instability and insecurity 
have created jobs, income and corruption. For security reasons 
international NGOs have moved their head offices from Mogadishu 
mostly to Nairobi, where a significant amount of the money, aimed at 
the Somalia operations, has ended up to international NGO elite and 
NGO machinery. Local people in Somaliland often complain that they 
do not know what numerous international, diaspora and local NGOs 
are really doing; local people just see that seminars are organized at 
expensive hotels, activities run by NGOs are invisible, and foreigners 
come and go asking questions but they never seem to come back 
and contribute to the needs of the people. Local NGOs are often 
small, inefficient and lacking capacity and resources. In Somaliland, 
a local researcher criticized:
NGO business becomes elitism! NGOs and politicians are not 
connected to the people. NGOs have no governance, boards of 
directors do not exist, they are only names on the paper. They 
make reports that donors want to have, they use the same reports 
they have been doing for 20 years. We do not ask hard questions: 
What do you really do? There is no real civil society. NGOs go and 
discuss with the government one by one. NGOs have no power 
base, they exploit the resources. They should have an important 
role also in following up and guiding the government, but there 
is no common voice or a platform for advocacy. (Tiilikainen, field 
notes January 6th, 2011.)
In general, the NGO scene in Somalia – as the country itself – is 
fragmented: During the civil war and instability in Somalia there has 
been little co-ordination or co-operation between various NGOs as 
2Marja Tiilikainen wants to acknowledge Senior Researcher Christine Jacobsen, IMER 
Bergen, and Dr. Anna Rastas, University of Tampere, for their helpful comments.
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many are competing over the funds. Moreover, little cooperation if 
any has been created between NGOs that work in different regions of 
Somalia, i.e. Somaliland, Puntland and South and Central Somalia. 
Having said this, however, it must be mentioned that also umbrella 
NGOs and CSOs in the different regions have been founded. In 
particular, women-led organizations have been recognized to have 
been able and willing to cross clan-divides. This may be due to 
women’s social role as mediators through inter-clan marriage (Quinn 
& Farah 2008: 7). In general, some of the most powerful NGOs have 
been managed by women, reflecting the central role of civil society 
as a platform for Somali women’s organization and rights (Menkhaus 
et al. 2010: 329).
It also needs to be emphasized that despite many challenges, 
there are several competent and committed NGOs in place in 
Somalia, which have also managed to establish themselves and 
secure funding from local sources or from the diaspora. These have 
been crucial in addressing community needs and implementing 
projects in the most challenging and difficult conditions (see also 
Human Development Report 2001: 56–57; Quinn & Farah 2008: 
10–11). Recently Somaliland has passed a Somaliland Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Law, which aims at coordinating 
and regulating the local and international NGOs’ activities in line 
with the development plan of Somaliland as well as improving the 
transparency and accountability of the NGOs (Somaliland NGOs 
Law 2010).
At the same time as the engagement of the Somali diaspora in 
Somalia is invaluable, the diaspora is also looked at by locals with 
some suspicion: For example, members of the diaspora who return to 
their country of origin are feared to take the good jobs and government 
positions because they are better educated and networked than the 
locals are. The diaspora is also seen as culturally different from people 
who never left Somalia: Those Somalis who have lived several years 
in Europe, North-America or Australia are believed to have changed 
their cultural and religious values or adopted new ideas on gender 
equality, they are seen to behave or dress differently from the local 
people, and moreover, they may be ridiculed for not mastering the 
Somali language completely. Any Somali coming from abroad is 
easily called by a negative label ‘dhaqan celis’, someone who is 
being returned to culture. In addition, the diaspora is sometimes 
perceived by locals as being too clannish and fragmented, in some 
cases even as warmongers (Abdile & Pirkkalainen 2011: 59–61; 
Tiilikainen 2011). The international community shares some of the 
concerns as regards co-operation with the Somali diaspora.
2   Somali diaspora, NGOs and engagement in 
     Somalia
The African Union sees the diaspora as the sixth region of Africa 
(African Union 2005, in Laakso 2011: 1). The importance of the 
Somali diaspora with regards to the economy of the country has been 
acknowledged. For example, the total flow of financial remittances 
from the Somali diaspora is estimated to be 1.3−2 billion USD 
annually, of which some 130−200 million USD per year is remitted 
for relief and development purposes (Hammond et al. 2011: 41). 
Indeed, remittances from the Somali diaspora have been a lifeline 
for many households during past 20 years. In addition, Somalis have 
been supporting larger community projects by collecting funds for the 
rehabilitation of hospitals and schools. Somali diasporic organizations 
have also been able to raise funds from national governments and 
donors as humanitarian assistance and for the rebuilding of Somalia. 
In Finland, for example, several Somali NGOs have received funding 
from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for development cooperation 
projects in Somalia. 
International organizations (including the EU, the UN, the African 
Union and IGAD) consider Somali diaspora as part of the civil society 
of Somalia. A representative of the EU delegation in Nairobi explained 
their co-operation with diaspora organizations from the Horn:
... [E]verybody is recognizing the importance of the diaspora 
and the need to coordinate better with the diaspora. ... [I]n the 
civil society platform that we are supporting there are many 
people from the diaspora as well. ... We include the diaspora 
as civil society actually. But I know that there should be more 
involvement, more interaction with the diaspora. With, I guess, 
the same difficulties that we have with the civil society: Diaspora 
is something which is plural, you have many countries with Somali 
people living there, you have many political affiliations, you have 
religious affiliation – we know that some are more inclined to 
support the opposition, insurgency, radical Islam – some are 
more towards the government, some are just supporting their 
families... So, diaspora is something very multiform and a bit 
vague as well, you know. ... [I]n figures it goes to 1.5 billion sent 
per year to Somalia, and this is important, this is crucial. ... We 
don’t target diaspora as such, but as part of civil society. (Political 
Advisor to European Union Delegation to the Republic of Kenya. 
Lund June 5th, 2010.)
On one hand, international organizations and governments 
regard Somali diaspora as a great potential, which may contribute 
positively by financial incentives and also by supporting peace 
building efforts in the fragile state of Somalia (e.g. Abdile 2010; 
Hoehne 2010; Ibrahim 2010). There are numerous examples of the 
involvement of diasporic Somalis in peace mediation, recreation 
of democratic political institutions, as well as capacity building 
and rehabilitation of the health and educational sectors in Somalia 
and Somaliland. For international governments and INGOs, the 
Somali diaspora has in many cases been indispensable, as they 
master Somali language, have necessary contacts on ground in 
Somalia and may have been able to visit areas of the country that 
have been hard to visit by Westerners due to security concerns 
past 20 years. International community also finds it easy to interact 
with diasporic Somalis who often are well-educated and who, 
so to say, ‘speak the same language’. As an official of the UNDP 
described:
They often speak the language that very much resonates with 
us. They can refer to accountability and transparency and human 
development, and the language is sophisticated. So, it makes 
them more approachable. (Country Director, UNDP Somalia. 
Lund June 4th, 2010.) 
On the other hand, international community does not really know 
how to deal with the Somali diaspora, or with Somali diasporas. 
Fragmentation of the diaspora, lack of one voice, is often mentioned 
as one of the problems of co-operation with the diaspora. This leads 
to the key problem of representation – international organizations 
and governments complain that they do not know with whom they 
work when they work with the diaspora groups. A representative of 
UNDP said:
42
Brought to you by | Kansalliskirjasto
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/16/18 11:14 AM
Usually it is an individual [who approaches us], who has the 
backing of some umbrella organization, which is very often 
very hard for us to know if this is like a briefcase organization, 
meaning nothing behind it, or whether it is a genuine organization 
with backing, experience and commitment by large numbers of 
diaspora. … They say they represent an organization, but they 
really represent an individual, they want to have job. (Country 
Director, UNDP Somalia. Lund June 4th, 2010.) 
A concern for the international community is that by working with 
specific diaspora organizations they engage only some individuals, 
or certain groups and clans, whereas they would like to reach civil 
society at large. There are also doubts if and to what extent the 
diaspora really may represent and speak for the people who live in 
Somalia. Previous UN Secretary-General Special Representative for 
Somalia warned about those members of the Somali diaspora, ‘who 
have a tendency to hijack the debate on Somalia. They are known 
as using Somalia crisis for personal advancement. Anyone from 
diaspora can come and say, I am intellectual.’ (Lund June 5th, 2010.) 
Diaspora organizations also often lack resources, skills and expertise 
to manage funded projects and report them. Moreover, the diaspora 
groups are not always believed to have accurate knowledge on the 
situation, conditions and developments on ground in Somalia, but 
make judgements which are misinformed. For example, an advisor 
to the African Union, said:
This is one of our main challenges, to really inform them 
[diaspora] about some of the things that have been achieved. 
You know, when someone leaves his country, he flees with his/
her own perceived notions. And most of the time when they 
arrive in the host country, they maintain them. So, if you left your 
country with the clannist mentality, when you arrived in Kenya 
or somewhere else, you stay with the same people from the 
same clan as you. In fact, I would even argue that the people 
who left Somalia during its worst times, still live in that time. They 
have not adjusted to current realities. (Advisor to the African 
Union, AMISOM, Special Envoy for Somalia. Lund June 5th, 
2010.) 
Among the most serious reservations related to possible co-
operation with the diasporas and their organizations is that diaspora 
in general may promote not only peace, but also instability and 
conflict in the country of origin (e.g. Brinkerhoff 2006). Parts of 
the Somali diaspora have been supporting insurgents in Somalia, 
including the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hisbul-Islam, and al-
Shabaab by, for example, financial assistance (Abdile 2010). 
Actually, the invasion of Ethiopia in December 2006 widely raged 
Somalis, and as followed, al-Shabaab gained wide popularity: They 
were seen by many as freedom and religious fighters and money 
was also collected among the Somali diasporas to support them. 
Some of those who initially supported al-Shabaab did so because 
they primarily wanted to support their clan members – one of the 
major clans was powerful in the Islamic Courts Union as well as in 
al-Shabaab. Somali diaspora has also played a role, sometimes 
unintentionally, in fuelling local disputes and clan conflicts, for 
example in the contested area between Somaliland and Puntland. 
Mahdi Abdile has given a couple of examples of these conflicts in 
his recent article (2010). Mahdi Abdile and Päivi Pirkkalainen (2011) 
have referred to ‘diaspora’s dual role’ in the homeland conflict. By the 
words of a diaspora returnee to Somaliland from Finland, whom they 
interviewed: 
Diaspora have founded educational institutions and contribute 
economically, but they also have a negative role. A lot of civil 
war happened in Somalia and Somaliland when money to buy 
guns came from the diaspora. They have two hands: one hand 
is feeding people, another hand killing people. (Interviewed 
January 2011, Abdile & Pirkkalainen 2011.) 
It is likely, however, that the money which ended up in buying 
guns, was initially meant  for other purposes such as renovating 
schools and roads.
Finally, over the past years the possible radicalisation of the 
diaspora has raised concern. There are some unfortunate examples 
of young Somalis, mainly boys, who have returned to Somalia from 
the Nordic countries and the North America, joined the fighting 
groups and become suicide bombers (Laakso 2011). The concerns 
that these few extreme cases raise, are linked to a wider discourse 
of securitization of Muslims. Since 11 September 2001, the global 
war on terror has led to securitization politics with regards to ‘failed’ 
states, including Somalia, where no effective government has been 
in place since 1991 (Verhoeven 2009). Somalia is seen as a seat 
for radical Islam where terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab may 
operate (Marchal 2009). This has led to counter-terrorism operations 
in the region and also Muslims in the ‘West’ have become ‘suspect 
communities’ (Hickman et al. 2011) whose movements, connections 
and possible radicalization have come under surveillance. 
One of the concrete impacts of the war on terror on the Somali 
households and NGOs operating in the region has been the increased 
mistrust and suspicion towards the remittance organizations known 
as hawala: They are seen as possible channels for money laundering 
and terrorist financing. In November 2001 al-Baraqaat, the largest 
and most well-known remittance organization, was closed down 
under the pressure from the US government. This was a serious 
blow to the country, which is dependent on remittances. Other 
money transfer companies such as Dahabshiil quickly took over 
the market share, but mistrust and increasing efforts to regulate 
remittances have been present ever since (Cockayne & Shetret 
2012: 34–35). In Finland, Dahabshiil is the most popular money 
transfer company to Somalia, and it has been able to function without 
disruptions.
3    Somali associations in Finland
In Finland, there is a strong tradition of voluntary associations. It is also 
easy to found an association – already three people who are over 15-
years of age may do that. The chairman and the vice-chairman must, 
however, be over 18 years old and residents of Finland. In Finland, 
associations have traditionally taken care of important common 
issues, for example, organized activities and lobbied for the good of 
children and youth, seniors, disabled people or environment, as well 
as organized sports or cultural opportunities. Moreover, associations 
are an important part of the political life in Finland as also political 
parties are associations.
Also migrants have noted the freedom of association in Finland 
and have been active in establishing voluntary associations 
(Pyykkönen 2005; Saksela 2003). They have realized that a registered 
association may be a channel to be heard, to have an impact on 
decisions made by authorities and importantly, to apply for funding. 
A registered migrant association, like any other association, may 
apply for funding for, for example, activities that support integration of 
migrants in Finland or development projects in the country of origin. 
Different activities may be funded by ministries, cities, municipalities 
as well as various foundations (also Guglielmo et al. 2010: 44). 
Among the migrants in Finland, Somalis have been the most 
active in founding associations. Since 1990, when the first groups 
of asylum seekers started to enter Finland, Somalis have founded 
over 100 associations.3 According to Päivi Pirkkalainen, who is 
working on her PhD on Somali diaspora associations, in 2010 some 
40–50 Somali NGOs were functional and active. The size of the 
associations varied from some 30 to 900 members, and in most cases 
the members included also people who resided outside Finland. For 
example, one of the interviewed organizations, Gannaane, reported 
that they had some 70 members in Finland, but around 1000 people 
in other countries (Guglielmo et al. 2010: 45–46). The majority of the 
associations have been registered in the capital region, that is, the 
cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa. This is natural as the majority 
of the Somalis live there. But Somalis have founded and registered 
associations also in many other towns: For example, several in the 
towns of Turku and Tampere, and one or two associations may even 
be found in the towns of Oulu in Northern Finland, and in Kajaani and 
Lieksa in Eastern Finland, quite far from the capital region. 
Associations may have been founded several years before they 
were registered. According to the Association Database, which is an 
official register of associations in Finland, the first Somalia-related 
association registered was Finland-Somalia Association in 1986. It 
is a friendship association which was originally founded by the Finns 
who had been involved with development co-operation projects in 
Somalia in the 1980s. Since 1990 when Somali asylum seekers 
started to enter Finland, the association’s importance and role rapidly 
increased, and also some newcomers joined it. 
The first associations founded by Somali migrants were registered 
already in 1992: Jaaliya (Somalien Yhdistys Jaaliya) in April 1992 
and Somaliland Association (Somaliland Seura) in December of the 
same year. Somaliland Association exists even today. This was a 
start for the organization of Somalis in Finland. The number of small 
associations increased rapidly. Moreover, religious associations and 
mosques were founded. After their arrival, Somalis in Helsinki joined 
the Islamic Society in Finland also known as Rabita mosque, founded 
in 1987 by Muslim migrants, but soon became active in founding 
new places for worship. Somalis had a central role, for example, in 
the foundation of al-Huda mosque (Helsinki Islamic Center), which 
is one of the largest mosque communities in Finland (registered in 
1995) and the Islamic Rahma Center, also in Helsinki, registered as 
a mosque in 1998. 
However, most Somalis did not have previous experience of 
how to run an association, even less so of associational life and 
regulations in Finland. Therefore, it was difficult for them to administer 
organizational routines, manage any project funding they might have 
received or report the use of the money to the donors. Moreover, 
associations seemed to duplicate their by-laws and plans from each 
other. Authorities, including that time Ombudsman for Foreigners 
Antti Seppälä started urging Somalis to find ways to improve the 
situation and the discussion in the Somali community started. Finally, 
the first umbrella organization, Somali League in Finland (Suomen 
Somaliliitto), was founded in 1996. As a result many small associations 
ceased to exist as their members joined the League. The general aim 
of the League was to represent the Somali community in Finland, 
promote the integration of Somalis and to act as a bridge between 
the Finnish and the Somali communities. 
Another umbrella organization named Finnish Somalia Network 
(Suomen Somalia-verkosto) was founded in 2004. Somali migrants 
had been actively approaching the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland by a large number of development project proposals, but 
very few had been granted funding because the Somali NGOs lacked 
capacity, knowledge and administrative experience. A turning point 
was a visit of the World Health Organization (WHO) representative in 
Somalia, Dr. Ibrahim Betelmal, in autumn 2003. He reported about a 
huge need for help in Somalia and urged the diaspora to return and 
do more for the country. The idea of creating a cooperation network 
that would improve the collaboration between different groups and 
organizations was born. 
The Department for International Development Cooperation 
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs strongly supported the idea, and 
they actually funded the Network for 5 years, before the Network 
was registered in 2009. The Ministry had (and still has) an interest 
in the Network, because they were willing to support Somalia, but 
in the unstable political situation the NGO funding was almost the 
only way to channel the money to the country. The Somali diaspora 
was regarded as an important partner, because they had cultural 
competence and contacts inside the country. 
The aim of the Network from the beginning has been to increase 
the number of effective development cooperation projects in 
Somalia. Another objective is to improve the capacity and skills of 
the organizations working with development cooperation by offering 
advice and education. Moreover, the aim is to increase co-operation 
between the organizations working in Somalia. In November 2012 
the Network had 34 member organizations, including 6 established 
Finnish organizations (e.g. Finn Church Aid and International 
Solidarity Foundation) and 28 Somali organizations. In recent years 
at least 10 of the Somali NGOs in the Network have been running 
several development projects in Somalia with the funding provided 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. This kind of a network, 
concentrating on the development cooperation in Somalia, which 
has managed to unite different organizations connected to different 
regions in Somalia, is seemingly unique in Europe.
3.1    The  problem  of  representation  –  A  clan  or  an  
         association?
A name of the organization may indicate a motivation behind the 
foundation of an association. Among the Somali associations there 
are, for example, associations that have been founded to enhance 
the development of Somalia and Somalis (e.g. Somali Social 
Development Association); to promote certain activities such as 
sports or culture (e.g. Somali Sports League in Finland – Suomen 
Somali Urheilu Liitto, SSUL); to support activities of certain social 
groups such as women, youth or parents (e.g. Association of Somali 
Parents in Espoo – Espoon Somalivanhempien yhdistys; Somaliland 
Youth Association of Turku – Turun Somalimaan nuorten yhdistys); 
or to bring together Somalis in a certain neighbourhood (e.g. Somalis 
of Kontula – Kontulan Somalialaiset): Kontula is a neighbourhood in 
Eastern Helsinki. Pirkkalainen has identified at least following types 
of Somali organizations in Finland: development organizations; 
youth/student organizations; women’s organizations; community 
organizations; multi-ethnic organizations; and professional networks/
organizations (Guglielmo et al. 2010: 45).
The issue of clan is not outspoken in Finland: Clans are not 
touched in the discussions with the Finns, mainly because Finnish 
people are not believed to understand or know the clan system 
and its significance. In general discussions between the Somalis, 
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Usually it is an individual [who approaches us], who has the 
backing of some umbrella organization, which is very often 
very hard for us to know if this is like a briefcase organization, 
meaning nothing behind it, or whether it is a genuine organization 
with backing, experience and commitment by large numbers of 
diaspora. … They say they represent an organization, but they 
really represent an individual, they want to have job. (Country 
Director, UNDP Somalia. Lund June 4th, 2010.) 
A concern for the international community is that by working with 
specific diaspora organizations they engage only some individuals, 
or certain groups and clans, whereas they would like to reach civil 
society at large. There are also doubts if and to what extent the 
diaspora really may represent and speak for the people who live in 
Somalia. Previous UN Secretary-General Special Representative for 
Somalia warned about those members of the Somali diaspora, ‘who 
have a tendency to hijack the debate on Somalia. They are known 
as using Somalia crisis for personal advancement. Anyone from 
diaspora can come and say, I am intellectual.’ (Lund June 5th, 2010.) 
Diaspora organizations also often lack resources, skills and expertise 
to manage funded projects and report them. Moreover, the diaspora 
groups are not always believed to have accurate knowledge on the 
situation, conditions and developments on ground in Somalia, but 
make judgements which are misinformed. For example, an advisor 
to the African Union, said:
This is one of our main challenges, to really inform them 
[diaspora] about some of the things that have been achieved. 
You know, when someone leaves his country, he flees with his/
her own perceived notions. And most of the time when they 
arrive in the host country, they maintain them. So, if you left your 
country with the clannist mentality, when you arrived in Kenya 
or somewhere else, you stay with the same people from the 
same clan as you. In fact, I would even argue that the people 
who left Somalia during its worst times, still live in that time. They 
have not adjusted to current realities. (Advisor to the African 
Union, AMISOM, Special Envoy for Somalia. Lund June 5th, 
2010.) 
Among the most serious reservations related to possible co-
operation with the diasporas and their organizations is that diaspora 
in general may promote not only peace, but also instability and 
conflict in the country of origin (e.g. Brinkerhoff 2006). Parts of 
the Somali diaspora have been supporting insurgents in Somalia, 
including the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hisbul-Islam, and al-
Shabaab by, for example, financial assistance (Abdile 2010). 
Actually, the invasion of Ethiopia in December 2006 widely raged 
Somalis, and as followed, al-Shabaab gained wide popularity: They 
were seen by many as freedom and religious fighters and money 
was also collected among the Somali diasporas to support them. 
Some of those who initially supported al-Shabaab did so because 
they primarily wanted to support their clan members – one of the 
major clans was powerful in the Islamic Courts Union as well as in 
al-Shabaab. Somali diaspora has also played a role, sometimes 
unintentionally, in fuelling local disputes and clan conflicts, for 
example in the contested area between Somaliland and Puntland. 
Mahdi Abdile has given a couple of examples of these conflicts in 
his recent article (2010). Mahdi Abdile and Päivi Pirkkalainen (2011) 
have referred to ‘diaspora’s dual role’ in the homeland conflict. By the 
words of a diaspora returnee to Somaliland from Finland, whom they 
interviewed: 
Diaspora have founded educational institutions and contribute 
economically, but they also have a negative role. A lot of civil 
war happened in Somalia and Somaliland when money to buy 
guns came from the diaspora. They have two hands: one hand 
is feeding people, another hand killing people. (Interviewed 
January 2011, Abdile & Pirkkalainen 2011.) 
It is likely, however, that the money which ended up in buying 
guns, was initially meant  for other purposes such as renovating 
schools and roads.
Finally, over the past years the possible radicalisation of the 
diaspora has raised concern. There are some unfortunate examples 
of young Somalis, mainly boys, who have returned to Somalia from 
the Nordic countries and the North America, joined the fighting 
groups and become suicide bombers (Laakso 2011). The concerns 
that these few extreme cases raise, are linked to a wider discourse 
of securitization of Muslims. Since 11 September 2001, the global 
war on terror has led to securitization politics with regards to ‘failed’ 
states, including Somalia, where no effective government has been 
in place since 1991 (Verhoeven 2009). Somalia is seen as a seat 
for radical Islam where terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab may 
operate (Marchal 2009). This has led to counter-terrorism operations 
in the region and also Muslims in the ‘West’ have become ‘suspect 
communities’ (Hickman et al. 2011) whose movements, connections 
and possible radicalization have come under surveillance. 
One of the concrete impacts of the war on terror on the Somali 
households and NGOs operating in the region has been the increased 
mistrust and suspicion towards the remittance organizations known 
as hawala: They are seen as possible channels for money laundering 
and terrorist financing. In November 2001 al-Baraqaat, the largest 
and most well-known remittance organization, was closed down 
under the pressure from the US government. This was a serious 
blow to the country, which is dependent on remittances. Other 
money transfer companies such as Dahabshiil quickly took over 
the market share, but mistrust and increasing efforts to regulate 
remittances have been present ever since (Cockayne & Shetret 
2012: 34–35). In Finland, Dahabshiil is the most popular money 
transfer company to Somalia, and it has been able to function without 
disruptions.
3    Somali associations in Finland
In Finland, there is a strong tradition of voluntary associations. It is also 
easy to found an association – already three people who are over 15-
years of age may do that. The chairman and the vice-chairman must, 
however, be over 18 years old and residents of Finland. In Finland, 
associations have traditionally taken care of important common 
issues, for example, organized activities and lobbied for the good of 
children and youth, seniors, disabled people or environment, as well 
as organized sports or cultural opportunities. Moreover, associations 
are an important part of the political life in Finland as also political 
parties are associations.
Also migrants have noted the freedom of association in Finland 
and have been active in establishing voluntary associations 
(Pyykkönen 2005; Saksela 2003). They have realized that a registered 
association may be a channel to be heard, to have an impact on 
decisions made by authorities and importantly, to apply for funding. 
A registered migrant association, like any other association, may 
apply for funding for, for example, activities that support integration of 
migrants in Finland or development projects in the country of origin. 
Different activities may be funded by ministries, cities, municipalities 
as well as various foundations (also Guglielmo et al. 2010: 44). 
Among the migrants in Finland, Somalis have been the most 
active in founding associations. Since 1990, when the first groups 
of asylum seekers started to enter Finland, Somalis have founded 
over 100 associations.3 According to Päivi Pirkkalainen, who is 
working on her PhD on Somali diaspora associations, in 2010 some 
40–50 Somali NGOs were functional and active. The size of the 
associations varied from some 30 to 900 members, and in most cases 
the members included also people who resided outside Finland. For 
example, one of the interviewed organizations, Gannaane, reported 
that they had some 70 members in Finland, but around 1000 people 
in other countries (Guglielmo et al. 2010: 45–46). The majority of the 
associations have been registered in the capital region, that is, the 
cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa. This is natural as the majority 
of the Somalis live there. But Somalis have founded and registered 
associations also in many other towns: For example, several in the 
towns of Turku and Tampere, and one or two associations may even 
be found in the towns of Oulu in Northern Finland, and in Kajaani and 
Lieksa in Eastern Finland, quite far from the capital region. 
Associations may have been founded several years before they 
were registered. According to the Association Database, which is an 
official register of associations in Finland, the first Somalia-related 
association registered was Finland-Somalia Association in 1986. It 
is a friendship association which was originally founded by the Finns 
who had been involved with development co-operation projects in 
Somalia in the 1980s. Since 1990 when Somali asylum seekers 
started to enter Finland, the association’s importance and role rapidly 
increased, and also some newcomers joined it. 
The first associations founded by Somali migrants were registered 
already in 1992: Jaaliya (Somalien Yhdistys Jaaliya) in April 1992 
and Somaliland Association (Somaliland Seura) in December of the 
same year. Somaliland Association exists even today. This was a 
start for the organization of Somalis in Finland. The number of small 
associations increased rapidly. Moreover, religious associations and 
mosques were founded. After their arrival, Somalis in Helsinki joined 
the Islamic Society in Finland also known as Rabita mosque, founded 
in 1987 by Muslim migrants, but soon became active in founding 
new places for worship. Somalis had a central role, for example, in 
the foundation of al-Huda mosque (Helsinki Islamic Center), which 
is one of the largest mosque communities in Finland (registered in 
1995) and the Islamic Rahma Center, also in Helsinki, registered as 
a mosque in 1998. 
However, most Somalis did not have previous experience of 
how to run an association, even less so of associational life and 
regulations in Finland. Therefore, it was difficult for them to administer 
organizational routines, manage any project funding they might have 
received or report the use of the money to the donors. Moreover, 
associations seemed to duplicate their by-laws and plans from each 
other. Authorities, including that time Ombudsman for Foreigners 
Antti Seppälä started urging Somalis to find ways to improve the 
situation and the discussion in the Somali community started. Finally, 
the first umbrella organization, Somali League in Finland (Suomen 
Somaliliitto), was founded in 1996. As a result many small associations 
ceased to exist as their members joined the League. The general aim 
of the League was to represent the Somali community in Finland, 
promote the integration of Somalis and to act as a bridge between 
the Finnish and the Somali communities. 
Another umbrella organization named Finnish Somalia Network 
(Suomen Somalia-verkosto) was founded in 2004. Somali migrants 
had been actively approaching the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland by a large number of development project proposals, but 
very few had been granted funding because the Somali NGOs lacked 
capacity, knowledge and administrative experience. A turning point 
was a visit of the World Health Organization (WHO) representative in 
Somalia, Dr. Ibrahim Betelmal, in autumn 2003. He reported about a 
huge need for help in Somalia and urged the diaspora to return and 
do more for the country. The idea of creating a cooperation network 
that would improve the collaboration between different groups and 
organizations was born. 
The Department for International Development Cooperation 
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs strongly supported the idea, and 
they actually funded the Network for 5 years, before the Network 
was registered in 2009. The Ministry had (and still has) an interest 
in the Network, because they were willing to support Somalia, but 
in the unstable political situation the NGO funding was almost the 
only way to channel the money to the country. The Somali diaspora 
was regarded as an important partner, because they had cultural 
competence and contacts inside the country. 
The aim of the Network from the beginning has been to increase 
the number of effective development cooperation projects in 
Somalia. Another objective is to improve the capacity and skills of 
the organizations working with development cooperation by offering 
advice and education. Moreover, the aim is to increase co-operation 
between the organizations working in Somalia. In November 2012 
the Network had 34 member organizations, including 6 established 
Finnish organizations (e.g. Finn Church Aid and International 
Solidarity Foundation) and 28 Somali organizations. In recent years 
at least 10 of the Somali NGOs in the Network have been running 
several development projects in Somalia with the funding provided 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. This kind of a network, 
concentrating on the development cooperation in Somalia, which 
has managed to unite different organizations connected to different 
regions in Somalia, is seemingly unique in Europe.
3.1    The  problem  of  representation  –  A  clan  or  an  
         association?
A name of the organization may indicate a motivation behind the 
foundation of an association. Among the Somali associations there 
are, for example, associations that have been founded to enhance 
the development of Somalia and Somalis (e.g. Somali Social 
Development Association); to promote certain activities such as 
sports or culture (e.g. Somali Sports League in Finland – Suomen 
Somali Urheilu Liitto, SSUL); to support activities of certain social 
groups such as women, youth or parents (e.g. Association of Somali 
Parents in Espoo – Espoon Somalivanhempien yhdistys; Somaliland 
Youth Association of Turku – Turun Somalimaan nuorten yhdistys); 
or to bring together Somalis in a certain neighbourhood (e.g. Somalis 
of Kontula – Kontulan Somalialaiset): Kontula is a neighbourhood in 
Eastern Helsinki. Pirkkalainen has identified at least following types 
of Somali organizations in Finland: development organizations; 
youth/student organizations; women’s organizations; community 
organizations; multi-ethnic organizations; and professional networks/
organizations (Guglielmo et al. 2010: 45).
The issue of clan is not outspoken in Finland: Clans are not 
touched in the discussions with the Finns, mainly because Finnish 
people are not believed to understand or know the clan system 
and its significance. In general discussions between the Somalis, 
3The search from the Association Register was done by words somali* and Somalia*. 
There are also Somali associations in whose names the Somalia connection is not that 
explicit (e.g. Golis Women’s Association). Therefore, the number of ever registered Somali 
associations in Finland is not exactly known.
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particular clans are not explicitly named either because they are still 
such sensitive issues following the civil war in Somalia. However, 
clans still play a role in how Somali migrants relate to or trust each 
other, and how they organize and operate transnationally. When the 
Somalis in Finland started to organize in the 1990s, the NGOs they 
founded were clan-based in the sense that the members, leaders 
and funders often belonged to the same clan. Following the civil war 
the cohesion of the society had been broken and one’s own family 
and clan were the only remaining social groups that might be trusted, 
in addition to religious leaders which at that time were believed to 
recreate the unity of the people. Therefore, many small associations 
were founded in Finland. Another reason was that like in Somalia, a 
registered organization was hoped to receive some financial benefits 
and assets, and even bring livelihood. Also, as the founders and 
most active members were – and still are – mainly men, associations 
can be seen as an alternative arena for Somali men, who mostly 
were unemployed in Finland, to regain their traditional male role in 
the public sphere and politics.
As the Somali community in Finland is very fragmented, it is 
not clear who can speak on behalf of and represent the community. 
Authorities often would like to have a body which could channel the 
views of the whole community, but so far this kind of a strong body 
does not exist. A key question is, how and on what grounds a group 
or an association may represent the Somalis in Finland.
Somali League in Finland has been an attempt to create this kind 
of a forum. Somali League is frequently turned to by authorities and 
the media in issues related to integration in Finland. In this sense the 
League has been successful and recognized, but among the Somalis 
its position has also been questioned. When the League was founded 
in 1996, all the major Somali clans in Finland were represented. 
Finally, in addition to a board, a council of elders (60 persons) was 
selected, based on the size of each major clan in Finland. Moreover, 
representatives of the two largest mosques, Rabita and al-Huda, 
were given their share in the committee. Also a couple of women 
were actively involved when the League was founded, but they were 
not included in the nominated committee. It was about power sharing, 
a founding member explained. To a question that who nowadays may 
represent Somalis in Finland, he replied:
Somali League represents us Somalis in Finland. All the large 
clans have been founding it, and even today we think of clan 
balance when we choose people to the board. The board has 
been selected by all of us. (Tiilikainen, field notes July 31st, 
2012.) 
Since the foundation of the Somali League the committee has 
decreased in size, currently comprising 25 seats. It is not named 
as the ‘council of elders’ any more, but just as an advisory council. 
However, the council has remained as a clan-based body. In addition, 
representatives from the mosques have been included since the very 
beginning – in particular al-Huda has been actively participating in 
and following the activities of the Somali League. One example of the 
importance of religious opinions was a lengthy discussion on whether 
Somali League should accept or not a significant funding it had 
been granted by the Finland’s Slot Machine Association (RAY). The 
problem was that the Slot Machine Association raises funds through 
gaming operations and some of the Islamic scholars opinioned that 
this kind of money was haram, forbidden, according to Islam, and 
therefore should not be used.
When the council members are selected, certain criteria, apart 
from the clan background, are considered: age – as the representative 
council member should not be too young; good reputation – as the 
elected person should be moral and respected from the religious point 
of view (e.g. he/she should not use alcohol or identify too strongly 
with the clan background); and the person should also have some 
educational background or other useful knowledge and experience. 
Women may become members of the executive committee and 
advisory council, but only a handful of women have been interested 
in these positions. This also reflects the clan-based male-dominance 
and traditional hierarchical structures of the association.
Political divisions and tensions reflect in the organizational life. 
When the Somali League was founded, all the major Somali clans 
were represented, including those originally inhabiting the Somaliland 
area. Since a couple of years the Somalis and associations in 
Finland who identify themselves as Somalilanders have withdrawn 
from the Somali League. The reason is that the Somali League has a 
nationalistic agenda and supports the unification of all Somalis under 
one flag. This is unacceptable for those Somalilanders who support 
independent Somaliland, as they feel that Somali League cannot 
represent them. 
In the Finnish Somalia Network, the other umbrella organization 
of the Somalis, the representation has been solved a bit differently. 
In the Network the members are not individuals, but organizations. 
Moreover, the member organizations are not only Somali 
organizations, but also Finnish organizations. At the board, in 2011 
there were representatives of 8 member organizations, out of which 
5 were Somali and 3 Finnish associations. The chairperson of the 
association is a Somali woman. The participation of women in the 
activities of the Network is encouraged, but the number of active 
Somali women is small. When selecting new Somali associations to 
the board, an issue to be considered is the previous experience and 
history of a candidate association. In addition, the area where the 
association is linked to in Somalia is important, because the Network 
wants to cover and have access to as a wide area in Somalia as 
possible. This means including representatives from organizations 
that work in different areas and political regions in Somalia – basically 
it also means including representatives from different clans, although 
normally it is not said aloud. 
The Finnish Somalia Network makes an effort to remain politically 
neutral, and it has managed to attract member organizations from 
all regions in Somalia, including Somaliland. The presence of Finns 
and Finnish organizations also neutralizes the atmosphere and 
helps to increase collaboration towards a common goal, that is, the 
development of Somalia. However, political disagreements and clan 
conflicts in Somalia are sensitive issues that at times create tensions 
within the Network, and therefore, sensitive topics and discussions 
are avoided when possible.
Although many Somali associations originally have been 
founded around a clan, it is not justified to claim that they would be 
(exclusively) clan-based. Indeed, the associations strongly criticize 
the use of the clan-factor in politics or associations and often claim 
that clan does not have any importance for them. The activities of the 
associations are said to be open to everyone, also the membership 
has widened to include people from other clans and regions – even 
Finns – and the money is collected from different sources, not only 
from one clan. Moreover, there are associations that clearly have 
been founded for joining, for example, certain professionals such as 
people from the health sector (also Guglielmo et al. 2010: 48). 
However, for the individuals and associations that conduct 
development projects in Somalia, clan and regional affiliations are still 
significant. In practice, during the 20-year-long instability in Somalia, 
clan roots in a certain area in Somalia have been instrumental in 
providing access to implement development projects. The Somali 
diaspora NGOs have mainly been running projects in areas where 
their family lineages are rooted. Clan affiliations create trust networks 
that make it possible to send money and implement projects without 
being there all the time. Even travelling and monitoring the projects 
inside Somalia has been possible once the clan has been able to 
provide necessary protection and safety. On the reverse side are 
situations, when a Somali from the diaspora is not able to travel to 
a certain area in Somalia during a clan conflict: A diasporic Somali, 
automatically counted as part of a (fighting) clan, would be an evident 
target for killing or kidnapping.
Clan membership may complicate the implementation of a 
development project also otherwise. Whether a person wants it or 
not, in the Somali context a person is automatically seen as part 
of his/her clan. It is like an address or a hallmark which helps to 
know who a person is. Some of the members of the Finnish Somalia 
Network who have been running projects in Somalia have told how 
their clan members may find it difficult to understand when a Somali 
coming from Finland tries to promote good practices in the projects 
funded by the Foreign Ministry and hire project staff in an open and 
competitive manner, instead of hiring a relative. Also in Finland, 
a Somali or his/her actions may easily be interpreted from a clan 
framework (for example, why a person has been invited to an event 
or not), even though in reality the clan had not played any role in a 
given action. 
But an NGO may also be used as a way to support one’s own 
family and clan. Once a family- or a clan-based organization in 
Finland has managed to secure funding for a project in Somalia, 
it may help relatives by employing them in the project. This will 
decrease the amount of personal remittances that otherwise should 
be sent to relatives in Somalia. Moreover, a successful diaspora 
NGO and positive image locally in Somalia may be used to gain a 
certain status, for example a position in the Somali politics. 
4    Conclusions
Somalis in Finland have actively organized and founded numerous 
associations. Founding an association has been motivated by the 
need to influence issues relevant to the Somalis both in Finland 
and in Somalia. Many organizations are active on both fronts – they 
conduct activities that may ease the life and integration of the Somalis 
in Finland, and also support peace-building and development efforts 
in Somalia. 
The authorities in Finland and other countries with Somali 
populations have welcomed the organization of Somalis as this in 
principle is believed to ease communications with the fragmented 
community. Somali and other migrant organizations are encouraged 
by municipalities and ministries to develop their administrative 
structures and routines further, and in the future take a larger 
responsibility on the service provision for migrant populations. Also 
international community has acknowledged the contributions that the 
Somali diaspora has done for the development of Somalia, and they 
try to find ways how to utilize them and enhance the collaboration 
even more. Transnational networking capacities and skills, including 
successful fundraising from multi-local communities for families and 
projects in Somalia, are among the acknowledged strengths of the 
communities.
At the same time as the diaspora is seen as an important agent 
in the development and rebuilding of Somalia, it is also increasingly 
framed as potentially ‘suspect’. This dual standing may impede 
the inclusion of Somali migrants as civil society actors. The first 
investigation into Somalis in Finland regarding suspected terrorism 
funding and recruitment started in September 2011. The case came 
as a big surprise to the larger Somali community in Finland and 
many found it hard to believe that anything criminal had happened. 
The case, however, worries many people as they fear that anyone 
who remits money home may easily be labeled as a terrorist – even 
when the receiver is a family member, one can never know for sure 
where the money in Somalia ends. Moreover, the policies aimed at 
the securitization of Islam, counter-terrorism policies and profiling of 
Somalis or Muslims in general may increase the sense of insecurity 
among the families, and even increase the risk of radicalization. 
However, so far the Somali community seems to trust that Finland 
is a state ruled by law where everyone will be treated according to 
law and justice.
Somali NGOs in Finland have gradually learnt to better manage 
associations according to laws and regulations, but there is still plenty 
of space for improvement. Somali NGOs struggle with the same 
issues as any other association: The number of active members is 
small, voluntary work is difficult due to family and income related 
obligations and worries, and the funding of associations is unsecure. 
In addition, Somali NGOs face other challenges, which may explain 
why they remain weak as civil society actors in Finland: short history 
and experience of NGOs in Somalia; lack of skills and capacity; 
unrealistic expectations regarding income or job security that an 
NGO could provide – once it becomes clear that an NGO does not 
provide them, but demands a lot of voluntary work, the motivation 
decreases; clan and political divides within the community, resulting 
to many small associations, mistrust and lack of co-operation; and the 
diasporic life itself which entails commitments, compelling relations 
and interests both in the receiving country and the country of origin. 
In Finland and many other Western countries NGOs and civil 
society organizations have an established role as platform for active 
citizenship. Among the Somalis, however, an NGO largely remains an 
alien and donor-driven concept. A closer look at the Somali diaspora 
organizations reveals in how complex ways kinship, clan, religious 
affiliations and associational structures may be utilized and blurred. 
Founding an association may have been a way particularly for the 
first generation Somali refugee men to regain self-esteem and social 
status in the public sphere, both in Finland and in Somalia. It remains 
to be seen if the second generation will be likewise active.
Clan elders and religious leaders are still respected and listened 
to among the Somalis. Therefore, for those who need to find 
‘representatives’ of the Somali diaspora community, it may be wise, 
on one hand, to approach the community on a wide front, including 
NGOs, religious authorities and some respected individuals and clan 
representatives in the community. On the other hand, traditional 
clan-based and patriarchal institutions may exclude women and 
the younger generation. Therefore, their participation has to be 
particularly searched for and encouraged. 
For the Somali diaspora, learning about and adapting to new 
organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms may 
also be protecting and empowering. Those Somalis, who want to 
take distance to political and clan tensions in the community, or those 
groups such as women who may not get their voice directly heard in 
the traditional structures, may find the Finnish association law and 
decision-making procedures as good tools to more equal, transparent 
and neutral collaboration and advocacy. Co-operation with the Finns 
in the associations has been mutually enriching and educating, and 
for example in the Finnish Somalia Network increased trust between 
different member organizations.
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particular clans are not explicitly named either because they are still 
such sensitive issues following the civil war in Somalia. However, 
clans still play a role in how Somali migrants relate to or trust each 
other, and how they organize and operate transnationally. When the 
Somalis in Finland started to organize in the 1990s, the NGOs they 
founded were clan-based in the sense that the members, leaders 
and funders often belonged to the same clan. Following the civil war 
the cohesion of the society had been broken and one’s own family 
and clan were the only remaining social groups that might be trusted, 
in addition to religious leaders which at that time were believed to 
recreate the unity of the people. Therefore, many small associations 
were founded in Finland. Another reason was that like in Somalia, a 
registered organization was hoped to receive some financial benefits 
and assets, and even bring livelihood. Also, as the founders and 
most active members were – and still are – mainly men, associations 
can be seen as an alternative arena for Somali men, who mostly 
were unemployed in Finland, to regain their traditional male role in 
the public sphere and politics.
As the Somali community in Finland is very fragmented, it is 
not clear who can speak on behalf of and represent the community. 
Authorities often would like to have a body which could channel the 
views of the whole community, but so far this kind of a strong body 
does not exist. A key question is, how and on what grounds a group 
or an association may represent the Somalis in Finland.
Somali League in Finland has been an attempt to create this kind 
of a forum. Somali League is frequently turned to by authorities and 
the media in issues related to integration in Finland. In this sense the 
League has been successful and recognized, but among the Somalis 
its position has also been questioned. When the League was founded 
in 1996, all the major Somali clans in Finland were represented. 
Finally, in addition to a board, a council of elders (60 persons) was 
selected, based on the size of each major clan in Finland. Moreover, 
representatives of the two largest mosques, Rabita and al-Huda, 
were given their share in the committee. Also a couple of women 
were actively involved when the League was founded, but they were 
not included in the nominated committee. It was about power sharing, 
a founding member explained. To a question that who nowadays may 
represent Somalis in Finland, he replied:
Somali League represents us Somalis in Finland. All the large 
clans have been founding it, and even today we think of clan 
balance when we choose people to the board. The board has 
been selected by all of us. (Tiilikainen, field notes July 31st, 
2012.) 
Since the foundation of the Somali League the committee has 
decreased in size, currently comprising 25 seats. It is not named 
as the ‘council of elders’ any more, but just as an advisory council. 
However, the council has remained as a clan-based body. In addition, 
representatives from the mosques have been included since the very 
beginning – in particular al-Huda has been actively participating in 
and following the activities of the Somali League. One example of the 
importance of religious opinions was a lengthy discussion on whether 
Somali League should accept or not a significant funding it had 
been granted by the Finland’s Slot Machine Association (RAY). The 
problem was that the Slot Machine Association raises funds through 
gaming operations and some of the Islamic scholars opinioned that 
this kind of money was haram, forbidden, according to Islam, and 
therefore should not be used.
When the council members are selected, certain criteria, apart 
from the clan background, are considered: age – as the representative 
council member should not be too young; good reputation – as the 
elected person should be moral and respected from the religious point 
of view (e.g. he/she should not use alcohol or identify too strongly 
with the clan background); and the person should also have some 
educational background or other useful knowledge and experience. 
Women may become members of the executive committee and 
advisory council, but only a handful of women have been interested 
in these positions. This also reflects the clan-based male-dominance 
and traditional hierarchical structures of the association.
Political divisions and tensions reflect in the organizational life. 
When the Somali League was founded, all the major Somali clans 
were represented, including those originally inhabiting the Somaliland 
area. Since a couple of years the Somalis and associations in 
Finland who identify themselves as Somalilanders have withdrawn 
from the Somali League. The reason is that the Somali League has a 
nationalistic agenda and supports the unification of all Somalis under 
one flag. This is unacceptable for those Somalilanders who support 
independent Somaliland, as they feel that Somali League cannot 
represent them. 
In the Finnish Somalia Network, the other umbrella organization 
of the Somalis, the representation has been solved a bit differently. 
In the Network the members are not individuals, but organizations. 
Moreover, the member organizations are not only Somali 
organizations, but also Finnish organizations. At the board, in 2011 
there were representatives of 8 member organizations, out of which 
5 were Somali and 3 Finnish associations. The chairperson of the 
association is a Somali woman. The participation of women in the 
activities of the Network is encouraged, but the number of active 
Somali women is small. When selecting new Somali associations to 
the board, an issue to be considered is the previous experience and 
history of a candidate association. In addition, the area where the 
association is linked to in Somalia is important, because the Network 
wants to cover and have access to as a wide area in Somalia as 
possible. This means including representatives from organizations 
that work in different areas and political regions in Somalia – basically 
it also means including representatives from different clans, although 
normally it is not said aloud. 
The Finnish Somalia Network makes an effort to remain politically 
neutral, and it has managed to attract member organizations from 
all regions in Somalia, including Somaliland. The presence of Finns 
and Finnish organizations also neutralizes the atmosphere and 
helps to increase collaboration towards a common goal, that is, the 
development of Somalia. However, political disagreements and clan 
conflicts in Somalia are sensitive issues that at times create tensions 
within the Network, and therefore, sensitive topics and discussions 
are avoided when possible.
Although many Somali associations originally have been 
founded around a clan, it is not justified to claim that they would be 
(exclusively) clan-based. Indeed, the associations strongly criticize 
the use of the clan-factor in politics or associations and often claim 
that clan does not have any importance for them. The activities of the 
associations are said to be open to everyone, also the membership 
has widened to include people from other clans and regions – even 
Finns – and the money is collected from different sources, not only 
from one clan. Moreover, there are associations that clearly have 
been founded for joining, for example, certain professionals such as 
people from the health sector (also Guglielmo et al. 2010: 48). 
However, for the individuals and associations that conduct 
development projects in Somalia, clan and regional affiliations are still 
significant. In practice, during the 20-year-long instability in Somalia, 
clan roots in a certain area in Somalia have been instrumental in 
providing access to implement development projects. The Somali 
diaspora NGOs have mainly been running projects in areas where 
their family lineages are rooted. Clan affiliations create trust networks 
that make it possible to send money and implement projects without 
being there all the time. Even travelling and monitoring the projects 
inside Somalia has been possible once the clan has been able to 
provide necessary protection and safety. On the reverse side are 
situations, when a Somali from the diaspora is not able to travel to 
a certain area in Somalia during a clan conflict: A diasporic Somali, 
automatically counted as part of a (fighting) clan, would be an evident 
target for killing or kidnapping.
Clan membership may complicate the implementation of a 
development project also otherwise. Whether a person wants it or 
not, in the Somali context a person is automatically seen as part 
of his/her clan. It is like an address or a hallmark which helps to 
know who a person is. Some of the members of the Finnish Somalia 
Network who have been running projects in Somalia have told how 
their clan members may find it difficult to understand when a Somali 
coming from Finland tries to promote good practices in the projects 
funded by the Foreign Ministry and hire project staff in an open and 
competitive manner, instead of hiring a relative. Also in Finland, 
a Somali or his/her actions may easily be interpreted from a clan 
framework (for example, why a person has been invited to an event 
or not), even though in reality the clan had not played any role in a 
given action. 
But an NGO may also be used as a way to support one’s own 
family and clan. Once a family- or a clan-based organization in 
Finland has managed to secure funding for a project in Somalia, 
it may help relatives by employing them in the project. This will 
decrease the amount of personal remittances that otherwise should 
be sent to relatives in Somalia. Moreover, a successful diaspora 
NGO and positive image locally in Somalia may be used to gain a 
certain status, for example a position in the Somali politics. 
4    Conclusions
Somalis in Finland have actively organized and founded numerous 
associations. Founding an association has been motivated by the 
need to influence issues relevant to the Somalis both in Finland 
and in Somalia. Many organizations are active on both fronts – they 
conduct activities that may ease the life and integration of the Somalis 
in Finland, and also support peace-building and development efforts 
in Somalia. 
The authorities in Finland and other countries with Somali 
populations have welcomed the organization of Somalis as this in 
principle is believed to ease communications with the fragmented 
community. Somali and other migrant organizations are encouraged 
by municipalities and ministries to develop their administrative 
structures and routines further, and in the future take a larger 
responsibility on the service provision for migrant populations. Also 
international community has acknowledged the contributions that the 
Somali diaspora has done for the development of Somalia, and they 
try to find ways how to utilize them and enhance the collaboration 
even more. Transnational networking capacities and skills, including 
successful fundraising from multi-local communities for families and 
projects in Somalia, are among the acknowledged strengths of the 
communities.
At the same time as the diaspora is seen as an important agent 
in the development and rebuilding of Somalia, it is also increasingly 
framed as potentially ‘suspect’. This dual standing may impede 
the inclusion of Somali migrants as civil society actors. The first 
investigation into Somalis in Finland regarding suspected terrorism 
funding and recruitment started in September 2011. The case came 
as a big surprise to the larger Somali community in Finland and 
many found it hard to believe that anything criminal had happened. 
The case, however, worries many people as they fear that anyone 
who remits money home may easily be labeled as a terrorist – even 
when the receiver is a family member, one can never know for sure 
where the money in Somalia ends. Moreover, the policies aimed at 
the securitization of Islam, counter-terrorism policies and profiling of 
Somalis or Muslims in general may increase the sense of insecurity 
among the families, and even increase the risk of radicalization. 
However, so far the Somali community seems to trust that Finland 
is a state ruled by law where everyone will be treated according to 
law and justice.
Somali NGOs in Finland have gradually learnt to better manage 
associations according to laws and regulations, but there is still plenty 
of space for improvement. Somali NGOs struggle with the same 
issues as any other association: The number of active members is 
small, voluntary work is difficult due to family and income related 
obligations and worries, and the funding of associations is unsecure. 
In addition, Somali NGOs face other challenges, which may explain 
why they remain weak as civil society actors in Finland: short history 
and experience of NGOs in Somalia; lack of skills and capacity; 
unrealistic expectations regarding income or job security that an 
NGO could provide – once it becomes clear that an NGO does not 
provide them, but demands a lot of voluntary work, the motivation 
decreases; clan and political divides within the community, resulting 
to many small associations, mistrust and lack of co-operation; and the 
diasporic life itself which entails commitments, compelling relations 
and interests both in the receiving country and the country of origin. 
In Finland and many other Western countries NGOs and civil 
society organizations have an established role as platform for active 
citizenship. Among the Somalis, however, an NGO largely remains an 
alien and donor-driven concept. A closer look at the Somali diaspora 
organizations reveals in how complex ways kinship, clan, religious 
affiliations and associational structures may be utilized and blurred. 
Founding an association may have been a way particularly for the 
first generation Somali refugee men to regain self-esteem and social 
status in the public sphere, both in Finland and in Somalia. It remains 
to be seen if the second generation will be likewise active.
Clan elders and religious leaders are still respected and listened 
to among the Somalis. Therefore, for those who need to find 
‘representatives’ of the Somali diaspora community, it may be wise, 
on one hand, to approach the community on a wide front, including 
NGOs, religious authorities and some respected individuals and clan 
representatives in the community. On the other hand, traditional 
clan-based and patriarchal institutions may exclude women and 
the younger generation. Therefore, their participation has to be 
particularly searched for and encouraged. 
For the Somali diaspora, learning about and adapting to new 
organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms may 
also be protecting and empowering. Those Somalis, who want to 
take distance to political and clan tensions in the community, or those 
groups such as women who may not get their voice directly heard in 
the traditional structures, may find the Finnish association law and 
decision-making procedures as good tools to more equal, transparent 
and neutral collaboration and advocacy. Co-operation with the Finns 
in the associations has been mutually enriching and educating, and 
for example in the Finnish Somalia Network increased trust between 
different member organizations.
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Finnish authorities are likely to regard the foundation of migrant 
associations and participation in organizational life as sign of 
successful integration and positive activity in the civil society. From 
a Foucauldian perspective, migrant associations and their regulation 
may even be seen as a way for a nation state to govern, control, 
‘normalize’ and even securitize migrants (e.g. Pyykkönen 2007). 
Through the example of the Somali diaspora associations, however, 
the question of civil society widens across national borders and 
habitual civic actors. It suggests a need to rethink the concept of ‘civil 
society’ itself and how it could be analytically used in understanding 
transnational, socially and culturally structured civic participation and 
agency. Finally, the complexities of the lives of Somali migrants, the 
various (multi-local) affiliations and social ties that they have, as well 
as internal struggles for representation and power presented in this 
article call for careful analysis on migrant groups and their internal 
heterogeneity.
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